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18 July 1966

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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18 July 1966

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\*Vietnam: (Information as of 4:30 AM EDT)

Political Developments in North Vietnam: President Ho Chi Minh has dramatized North Vietnam's determination to persist in its struggle with "US imperialism" by signing a decree calling for "partial mobilization" of the reserves.


In view of the high degree of mobilization already existing in North Vietnam, coupled with the fact that substantial numbers of reserves have already been recalled to active duty, it would appear that this decree was promulgated primarily for propaganda purposes.

In a concurrent statement published on 17 July, Ho warned that although the US might send "500,000 troops, a million, or even more," they could "never" break the "iron will of the heroic Vietnamese people." Although conceding that "the war may last five, ten, or twenty years or longer" and that Hanoi and Haiphong might be destroyed, Ho insisted that the Vietnamese people would not be intimidated. The North Vietnamese leader reiterated the longstanding Communist contention that a settlement in South Vietnam could only be achieved on the basis of North Vietnam's "fourpoint" and the Liberation Front's "five-point" programs.

Ho's stiff line was echoed in a National Defense Council communique of 17 July which claimed that although the "US imperialists had hoped to shake the morale of our people" with the recent bombing near Hanoi and Haiphong, these actions only served "to promote our determination to fight until final victory." Without explicitly threatening North Vietnamese military intervention in South Vietnam, the communique called upon the army and the people of the North to extend "all out" support to their "southern compatriots."

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The Military Situation in South Vietnam: The only significant contact with VC/PAVN forces during the past 48 hours has centered in northern Quang Tri Province. Two operations have engaged enemy troops within a few miles of the Demilitarized Zone.

In Operation Hastings/Lam Son 289, a USMC company fought a prolonged action on 16 July with an estimated 100-man VC force. Cumulative casualties in the operation which began 7 July include 28 US killed and 58 wounded as against 138 enemy dead. In Operation DECK HOUSE II, US Marines made helicopter and amphibious landings about 35 miles north of Hue, and made light contact with the enemy. Naval gunfire support is being provided by units of the Seventh Fleet.

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Yemen-Egypt: /Yemeni republican relations with the Egyptians appear to be heading toward the most serious crisis since the September 1962 revolution./

Yemeni resentment of the Egyptian occupation and interference in Yemeni internal affairs is crystallizing rapidly and bringing together hitherto antipathetic governmental, tribal, and military leaders, including the army chief of staff.

Prime Minister Amri, along with several other cabinet members, has tendered his resignation following failure in Cairo to obtain satisfaction from Nasir. As a next move the Yemeni leaders may call a meeting in Sana during the coming week to provide a forum for openly voicing dissatisfaction. If peaceful methods do not bring results, the Yemenis may resort to armed harassment of Egyptian forces and assassination of pro-Egyptian "stooges."

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negotiations are being carried on between usually antagonistic tribes in the Sana area to form a united front in view of the deteriorating relations between the Yemenis and the Egyptians.

The chief of the Egyptian land forces has made an unscheduled visit to Yemen to size up the situation. One report indicates that the Egyptians may "unmask" an alleged "pro-American plot" in an attempt to discredit the dissatisfied Yemenis. These include a goodly portion of the Yemeni leaders, but not the incompetent Egyptian-backed President Sallal, who is a prime target of the disgruntled republican leadership.

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Japan-Korea: Tokyo's decision to allow three North Korean technicians to enter Japan threatens to worsen relations with South Korea.

The permission is being granted to facilitate possible sale of a \$4-million chemical plant to Pyongyang. Having completed the normalization of relations with South Korea last December, Prime Minister Sato now feels he is in a better position to permit some expansion of economic ties with Pyongyang, as desired by Japanese business interests. He probably reasons that a reluctance to jeopardize the flow of aid provided for in the normalization treaty will restrict Seoul in making an issue of Japanese commercial contacts with North Korea.

Seoul is resigned to some increase in Japanese trade with the North, but for domestic political reasons cannot appear to acquiesce in Tokyo's action. Following a special cabinet meeting on 15 July, the foreign minister delivered a "strong warning" to the Japanese ambassador. Subsequently, the Korean ambassador in Tokyo was called home. There also have been intimations that retaliatory measures might be taken against Japanese business in Korea. Public opinion may push the South Korean Government into stronger measures.

Pyongyang is well aware that its pursuit of Japanese trade provides a continuing irritant to Japanese - South Korean relations. Having secured the entry of its technicians to Japan, Pyongyang's next effort may be to establish private trade offices in Tokyo similar to those Japan has allowed Peking.	25X1
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The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

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The Under Secretary of the Treasury

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The Secretary of the Navy

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Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

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